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W SERIES No. 157 



JANUARY 1, 1919 



BULLETIN OF THE STATE 

UNIVERSITY OF IOWA 



SYLLABUS ON THE ISSUES 
OF THE WAR 



Published by the University, Iowa City, Iowa 



Issued semi-monthly throughout the year. Entered at the post office at Iowa City, 

Iowa, as second class matter. Acceptance for mailing at special rate 

of postage provided for in section 1103, Act of October 3, 

1917, authorized on July 3, 1918. 



Monograph 



THE STATE 
UNIVERSITY OF IOWA 

IOWA CITY 




SYLLABUS ON THE ISSUES 
OF THE WAR 



Published by the University 
Iowa City, Iowa 






n. of *. 

MAh 25 1919 



SYLLABUS ON THE ISSUES OF THE WAR 



i 



INTRODUCTION 

The course on the issues of the war prescribed by the War 
Department for members of the Students' Army Training Corps 
was to be divided into three general topics, (1) the historical 
and economic problems of the nations involved, (2) their social 
and governmental conditions, and (3) their philosophies and 
literatures. Each topic was to be treated during a single term. 
Very wisely the Committee on Education and Special Training 
permitted the institutions which maintained units of the Corps 
some leeway in the evolution of the details of the course. Since 
the armistice was signed before the close of the first term, only 
a third of the course was carried out according to the original 
plans. The officers in charge of the course at the University of 
Iowa contemplated the publication, for the use of the University 
and of such other institutions as might desire to employ them, 
of three sets of syllabi. Only one set was completed, but, while 
the immediate purpose is no longer to be served, it has seemed 
advisable to publish this first syllabus as a record of the course 
and a guide for later study of the great war. The syllabus was 
compiled by the chairmen of instructional groups and edited by 
Professor Van der Zee. , 

At the University the course was organized in the College of 
Liberal Arts under a special committee consisting of the follow- 
ing persons : Professor C. H. Weller, chairman, Professor N. A. 
Brisco, Professor F. C. Ensign, Associate Professor Percival 
Hunt, Professor H. G-. Plum, Dean C. E. Seashore, and Professor 
B. F. Shambaugh. After its organization the course was admin- 
istered by the chairman of the committee. 

Under the original plans of the War Department it was ex- 
pected that members of the S. A. T. C. of twenty years and over 
should be transferred to officers' training camps at the end of 
one term. This condition made it seem wise to outline for the 



period as comprehensive a course as possible under the first 
general theme. The committee in charge selected eleven topics, 
one for each week of the term. Instruction in the several topics 
was given by groups of two or more members of the University 
faculty, who should thus be able to confine their attention to a 
single subject rather than be compelled, less academically, to 
cover a large series of subjects, some of them quite foreign from 
the special line of study with which the instructors were technic- 
ally acquainted. In execution this plan developed entirely suc- 
cessfully. The names of the instructors of each topic, with their 
regular departments, are as follows : 

Topic I 
Professor Gilbert Giddings Benjamin, Chairman History 

Associate Professor Glenn Newton Merry Public Speaking 
Assistant Professor Joseph Simeon Magnuson Latin 

Topic II 

Professor Frank Edward Horack, Chairman Political Science 

Professor Benjamin Franklin Shambaugh Political Science 

Associate Professor Richard Philip Baker Mathematics 

Assistant Professor Clara May Daley History 

Mr. Aubrey Ward Goodenough English 

Topic III 
Associate Professor Nathaniel Ruggles Whitney, Chairman 

Economics 
Assistant Professor Fred Emory Haynes Sociology 

Assistant Professor Clarence Wycliffe Wassam Economics 

Topic IV 
Professor Charles Leonidas Robbins, Chairman Education 

Associate Professor Elbert Nevius Sebring Thompson English 
Assistant Professor Ernest James Ashbaugh Extension Division 
Mrs. Grace Partridge Smith Greek 

Topic V 
Assistant Professor Jacob Van der Zee, Chairman 

Political Science 
Associate Professor Edward Henry Lauer German 

Dr. John Ely Briggs Political Science 

Topic VI 

Professor Harry Grant Plum, Chairman History 

Professor Bohumil Shimek Botany 

Assistant Professor Herbert Funk Goodrich Law 



Dr. Sudhindra Bose Political Science 

Miss Eva Maria Campbell English 

Topic VII 

Associate Professor Louis Pelzer, Chairman History 

Miss Estella May Boot English 

Miss Chloris Shade History 

Topic VIII 

Professor Abram Owen Thomas, Chairman Geology 

Professor Wilbur John Teeters Pharmacy 

Professor Robert Bradford Wylie Botany 

Mr. Dayton Stoner Zoology 

Topic IX 
Professor Edwin Diller Starbuck, Chairman Philosophy 

Associate Professor Clarence Marsh Case Sociology 

Topic X 
Assistant Professor John Hubert Scott, Chairman English 
Mrs. Grace Partridge Smith Greek 

Topic XI 
Associate Professor Sam Berkley Sloan, Chairman English 

Professor Charles Bundy Wilson German 

Professor Franklin Hazen Potter Latin 

Assistant Professor Frank Albert Stromsten Animal Biology 

Instruction was given throughout the term to more.frhan 1300 
men. The course was also made available to women, of whom 
about 225 elected it. For the men the course was given in forty- 
four sections, or classes ; for the women, in eleven sections. Ref- 
erence books in sufficient numbers for use in all study centers 
were provided by the University. 

Testimony of students and faculty was virtually unanimous as 
to the value and intrinsic interest of the course. Interruptions 
due to the exigencies of introducing an unusual regime for the 
University and to a long quarantine for an epidemic of the 
influenza made the course less systematic than might have been 
desired for the men ; the women followed it through with great 
regularity. That the course served to arouse a keener interest 
and a finer intelligence as to the issues of the war is indubitable. 
It also stirred many students — and, it may be added, members 
of the faculty as well — to the study of the questions involved in 
the war. The course was distinctly worth while. C. H. "W. 



TOPIC I 
IMMEDIATE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 

Compiled by G. G. Benjamin 

I. THE UNIFICATION OF GERMANY AND THE DI- 
PLOMACY OF BISMARCK 

1. The means of unification 

a. The development of a strong Prussian army. 
Bismarck declared: "But Prussia must keep her 
strength intact for the favorable movement, which 
is too often missed. Prussia's boundaries are not 
favorable to the development of a strong body poli- 
tic. Not through fine speeches and majority reso- 
lutions will the question of the hour be decided — 
that was the mistake of 1848 and 1849 — but by 
Iron and Blood." 

b. The three wars 

(1) War against Denmark (1864) 

(2) Austro-Prussian War (1866) 

(3) Franco-Prussian War (1870-1871) 

2. The results of war 

a. The unification of Germany 

b. The weakening of France 

c. Among Germans a firm belief in the value of 
militarism 

d. The Alsace-Lorraine question 

3. Diplomatic aims of Bismarck (1871-1890) 

a. Isolation of France 

(1) By means of a division of parties in France 

(2) By the establishment of a French Colonial 
Empire 

b. Friendship with Austria, Russia, and Great Britain. 
Cf. The formation of the Three Emperors' League 
(1872) 



c. The Congress of Berlin (1878) 

(1) Purpose 

(2) Results: the formation of an alliance between 
Germany and Austria owing to Russia's hos- 
tility to Germany. 

"Bismarck aimed at isolating France in Europe and 
at encouraging the war of parties .... which 
would postpone the unity that was the first condition 
of a sane and healthy recuperation, and of a France 
valuable to the other allies. Great Britain, absorbed 
in domestic and colonial problems, was only formidable 
on the Continent if allied with a strong continental 
state. The Italian kingdom was struggling with finan- 
cial chaos, unification, and the hostility of the Vatican. 
. . . . By encouraging French colonial expansion 
east of Algiers, a wedge was driven between France and 
Italy Russia must be also isolated, for iso- 
lation from other European states meant dependence 

on Berlin With Austria, Bismarck desired 

a reconciliation and an understanding which cut away 
a Catholic power from Catholic France." — Robertson 
and Marriott, Evolution of Prussia, 400-403. 

d. The formation of an alliance by Germany, Austria, 

and Italy (1882) 

(1) Purposes of the Triple Alliance 

(a) To establish a great European alliance 
under the leadership of Germany 

(b) To keep France isolated 

(c) To control the diplomacy of Europe 

(d) To obtain for Germany "a security in 
foreign affairs" 

" Should the irritation in Russia increase to the 
point of war, Germany was sure of an ally. Should 
France yield to her desire for revenge and attack 
Germany, neutrality was assured ; should France 
in a war be aided by Russia, Austro-Hungarian as- 
sistance was pledged." — Holt and Chilton. 

(2) Results 

(a) Military force as a deciding issue in 
international affairs 



(b) The ultimate forming of opposing alli- 
ances by other powers 

II. INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS FROM 1890 TO 1914 

1. The dismissal of Bismarck and the ascendancy of 

William II. 

a. Effect of Bismarck's downfall 

"The one man who possessed the power to separate 
France and Russia thus disappeared. In Russia the 
disgrace of Bismarck aroused not merely surprise but 
dismay." — Seymour, 49, 50. 

b. Diplomatic policies of "William II. 

(1) Maintain German prestige on the Continent 
"Being deeply imbued with Bismarck's prin- 
ciples, William II had no illusions on the subject. 
The very system was in danger, which it was his 
mission to safeguard. If any one will read over the 
seven hundred and some odd speeches .... 
pronounced by the voluble orator who presides 
over the destinies of the German Empire, a fixed 

idea will be found in them This idea is 

that Germany must maintain the position gained 
by her victorious war against France." — Tardieu, 
France and the Alliances, 162. 

(2) Render Russo-French entente harmless 

(3) To achieve world domination by means of 

(a) A strong colonial empire 

(b) Commercial supremacy 

(c) A powerful navy 

2. Steps leading to the Triple Entente 

a. The Dual Entente between France and Russia 
(1891-1896) 

b. The Entente Cordiale between France and Great 
Britain (1904-1905) 

c. The Russo-British Treaty or Understanding (1907) 
"A policy that aims to hem Germany in, to draw around 

us a circle of the Powers for the purpose of isolating us, 



would be a very dangerous policy for the peace of Europe. ' ' 
— Chancellor von Buelow in the Reichstag, Nov. 4, 1906. 

3. a. The Moroccan crises (1905, 1907, 1911) 

(1) The Tangier affair and the Algeciras Confer- 
ences (1905-1906) 

(2) Casablanca (1907) 

(3) Agadir (1911) 

"Our peace is safeguarded not by such accommoda- 
tion nor by agreements, but only by our trusty German 
sword, and at the same time by the feeling, which is 
probably in the minds of the French .... that 
we also hope to see to it that there shall be a Govern- 
ment which is determined not to let that sword rust 
when the proper time comes. ' ' — Von Hildebrand, Agra- 
rian Conservative Leaders, Nov. 9, 1911. 

"Germany gained no prestige, but rather emerged 
crestfallen. Her press was full of severe denunciations. 
There was as usual the stereotyped complaint that Ger- 
many could not have her place in the sun ! There was 
intense bitterness against Russia while Italy was greatly 
censured." — Bracq, The Provocation of France. 

b. The Bosnian affair (1908) 

c. The Bagdad Railway and the Middle European 
Project 

d. Tripolitan and Balkan Wars, (1911-1913) and their 
results 

e. Conflict between German interests and those of Eng- 
land, France, and Russia 

TOPIC II 
RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE WAR 

Compiled by F. E. Horack 

THE AUSTRIAN ULTIMATUM AND THE SERBIAN 
REPLY (JULY 23-25, 1914) 

1. The pretext for the ultimatum 

The murder of the heir to the Austrian throne on June 
28, 1914, at Sarajevo. Austria had expressed an inten- 
tion to have a reckoning with Serbia. 

9 



2. The formidable character of the ultimatum 

It was intended to provoke war. An acceptance of its 
provisions would have sacrificed Serbia's sovereignty 
and independence. Delivered July 23, 1914, it de- 
manded a reply within forty-eight hours. 

3. The ultimatum known to Germany before it was sent 

to Serbia 
The "decisive conference" at Potsdam on July 5, 1914. 

4. The attitude of the powers 

England, France, and Russia endeavored to preserve 
peace. The first attempts at conciliation were repulsed 
by Germany and Austria. 

5. The Serbian reply 

Serbia accepted without qualification eight of the ten 
demands made by Austria. Only a qualified acceptance 
was made of the other two, the unqualified acceptance 
of which would have rendered Serbia a vassal of 
Austria. However, Serbia offered to submit the points 
at issue to the Hague Tribunal or to the Great Powers 
in case her reply was not considered satisfactory. 

II. AUSTRIA'S REFUSAL TO ACCEPT THE SERBIAN 
REPLY AND THE DECLARATION OF WAR 
AGAINST SERBIA (JULY 25-28, 1914) 

1. Scant consideration given the Serbian reply 

The Serbian reply received at 5 :58 P. M. on July 25th, 
and the Austrian minister left Belgrade with all his 
staff at 6 :30. 

2. Declaration of the Austrian foreign minister 

The Austrian government could not enter into any dis- 
cussion of the terms of the Austrian note. 

2. Declaration of war 

In spite of all the efforts of England, France, and 
Russia for mediation, Austria declared war on Serbia, 
July 28, 1914. 

10 



4. Germany's part in the trouble 

Germany insisted that the conflict should be "local- 
ized," and that England and France should persuade 
Russia not to intervene, so that Austria might have a 
free hand. In this manner Germany endeavored to 
throw responsibility on the Entente powers, should war 
break out. 

5. Repulse of two further attempts at conciliation by 

Germany and Austria 
Both England and Russia admitted that perhaps 
Austria had some grounds for complaint against 
Serbia ; but England insisted that under the pretext of 
humiliating Serbia the humiliation of Russia must not 
be involved. Russia insisted that the territorial integ- 
rity of Serbia should be guaranteed, and her rights as 
a sovereign state be respected. 

a. Sir Edward Grey proposed mediation of the 
powers not directly concerned (which included 
Germany) for the purpose of finding a way out. 

b. Russia offered to confer directly with Austria. 
Germany would not agree to the first proposal 
nor would Austria consent to the second. 

III. THE FIRST ULTIMATUM OF GERMANY TO RUSSIA 
(JULY 29-30, 1914) 

1. Negotiations by the Triple Entente and Italy in an 

effort to avert war 
Germany kept insisting that Austria should not be 
brought before a European court. Sir Edward Grey 
proposed that since the German government officials 
objected to the form of his proposal for a conference 
they should themselves suggest a workable form. 
Germany would offer none. 

2. The first ultimatum by German}) to Russia 

The mobilization of the Austrian army on the Russian 
frontier led to similar military measures on the part of 
Russia. Russia assured Germany that these military 
precautions were not directed against Germany. 

11 



3. Germany's threat 

Germany informed Russia that if she did not stop her 
military preparations, the German army would receive 
orders to mobilize. Notice of German orders to mobil- 
ize appeared in the Berlin Lokal Anzeiger before Rus- 
sian mobilization, and was then declared to be false, 
but Russia had acted on the information and ordered 
mobilization. 

4. German ultimatum withdrawn 

Germany, doubtful of England's attitude, asked on 
what conditions Russia would suspend her mobilization 
and withdrew the ultimatum. 

5. Russia's further pacific proposal rejected by Germany 
The Czar offered to stop all military preparations if 
Austria would recognize that the Serbian dispute had 
assumed the character of a question of European inter- 
est. Germany declared such a proposition unacceptable 
to Austria without referring it to her. 

IV. THE DECLARATION OF WAR AGAINST RUSSIA 
AND PRANCE (JULY 31-AUGUST 3, 1914) 

1. The second ultimatum of Germany to Russia 
Although both Austria and Russia had mobilized, they 
had agreed that mobilization should not be considered 
as an act of hostility. Kaiser William sent a threaten- 
ing telegram to Czar Nicholas complaining of the Rus- 
sian mobilization. At midnight of July 31st Germany 
demanded that Russia stop all military preparations 
against Germany as well as against Austria within 
twelve hours. 

2. A new formula of compromise accepted by Austria and 

rejected by Germany 
On August 1st, Austria manifested a willingness "to 
discuss what settlement would be compatible with the 
dignity and prestige for which both Empires (Austria 
and Russia) had equal concern." Austria was now 
willing to permit the great powers to decide what satis- 

12 



faction Serbia should afford Austria. Germany, how- 
ever, refused to accept any formula and declared that 
Russia must submit to the demands of Germany. 

3. The declaration of war against Russia 

After the expiration of the time limit on the second 
German ultimatum the Czar sent a final appeal to 
Emperor William to continue negotiations. At 7 :10 
P. M. on August 1st Germany declared war on Russia. 
Austria did not declare war until five days later. 

4. The declaration of war against France, August 3, 1914 
France kept her troops six miles from the frontier in 
order not to provoke an attack while negotiations were 
still possible. Germany, wishing to crush France and 
then turn against Russia, struck first and manufactured 
her reasons afterwards. It was not easy for Germany 
to find a reason for a declaration of war against France. 
That French aviators had dropped bombs on German 
territory and other like charges have been proved 
absolutely false. 

V. THE VIOLATION OF BELGIAN NEUTRALITY AND 
THE DECLARATION OF WAR BY ENGLAND 
AGAINST GERMANY (AUGUST 2-4, 1914) 

1. German belief as to England's attitude 

German statesmen had figured that owing to embit- 
tered party relations, troubles in Ireland, unrest in 
India, labor troubles, and military unpreparedness, 
Great Britain would probably keep out of the struggle. 

2. British diplomacy 

The German White Book itself admitted that Great 
Britain strove earnestly and energetically for peace. 

3. Grey's announcement 

Sir Edward Grey insisted that England would main- 
tain her freedom of action, that is, England was "free 
from engagements." Circumstances and British inter- 
ests would have to decide what stand England would 
take. 

13 



4. Germany's "Infamous Proposal" 

In return for British neutrality in case of war between 
Germany and France, Germany would promise not to 
take any territory of France in Europe. The neutral- 
ity of Holland would be respected ; but in case Germany 
was obliged to violate Belgium's neutrality she would 
evacuate Belgium after the war if Belgium did not 
side against Germany. Great Britain emphatically re- 
jected this proposal. 

5. Grey's proposal 

Sir Edward Grey held out the prospect of a league of 
peace (July 30th) ; but Germany made no reply to the 
suggestion. The German government, however, in- 
quired on August 1st if Great Britain would keep out 
if Germany respected Belgium's neutrality. Great 
Britain refused to commit herself, but did say that she 
would not come in if Russia and France rejected any 
reasonable peace proposals. 

6. Violation of the neutrality of Luxemburg and Belgium 

a. German troops invaded Luxemburg on August 2, 
1914. 

b. On the same day at 7 P. M. Germany demanded 
permission to pass through Belgium on the way to 
France, declaring that should Belgium resist she 
would be considered an enemy and be treated ac- 
cordingly. 

c. Belgium refused to grant such permission, declar- 
ing that to do so would sacrifice the honor of the 
nation and betray its duty towards Europe. Ger- 
man forces entered Belgium August 4, 1914, justi- 
fying their violation of Belgium's neutrality on the 
grounds of "necessity" — "necessity knows no 
law." 

7. Great Britain's declaration of war 

The threatened invasion of Belgium brought from the 
Belgian king an appeal to the king of England for 
intervention, August 3, 1914. Great Britain thereupon 
sent an ultimatum to Germany demanding that she 

14 



respect the neutrality of Belgium. German invasion 
proceeded, and Great Britain declared war upon Ger- 
many about midnight, August 4, 1914. In the parting 
interviews of the British Ambassador with the German 
Chancellor, the latter declared Great Britain was mak- 
ing war upon a kindred nation "just for a word — 
'neutrality' — just for a scrap of paper." 

VI. PROOF OF GERMANY'S RESPONSIBILITY FOR 
THE WAR 

1. The decisive conference at Potsdam on July 5, 1914 

a. It was decided that Austria should have a reckon- 
ing with Serbia and that if war with Russia re- 
sulted it would not matter. 

b. Germany's knowledge of the ultimatum to Serbia 
before it was delivered. 

2. Germany's support of Austrian demands 
Whole-hearted endorsement the moment they became 
generally known, and unwillingness to assent to a con- 
ference of ambassadors for fear of diplomatic defeat. 

3. Testimony of Prince Lichnowsky 

The German Ambassador to England declares in his 
My Mission to London, 1912-1914, that "we insisted 
on war;" and concludes that "it is no wonder that the 
whole of the civilized world outside Germany places the 
entire responsibility for the world-war upon our 
shoulders. ' ' 

4. Revelations by an ex-director of the Krupp munition 

works 

CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE OF THE THIRTEEN DAYS. 
JULY 23 TO AUGUST 4, 1914 

Austria issues ultimatum to Serbia 
Serbian reply to ultimatum 
Austria declares war on Serbia 
Russian partial mobilization 
July 31 Austrian general mobilization 

15 



July 


23 


July 


25 


July 


28 


July 


29 



July 31 Russian general mobilization 

July 31 Germany declares ' ' State of War ' ' 

August 1 Germany declares war on Russia 

August 2 Germany issues ultimatum to Belgium 

August 3 Germany declares war on France 

August 4 England declares war on Germany 

TOPIC III 
ECONOMIC AND COMMERCIAL RIVALRY 

Compiled by N. R. Whitney 
I. EFFECTS OF THE GROWTH OF NATIONALITY 

1. Wars due to conflicts in nationality 

"Nationality" defined as group consciousness or 
group egotism leads people in a given nation or state to 
regard themselves as dependent for their well-being 
solely on themselves, and dependent especially for this 
well-being on group action against other groups. The 
spirit is not one of cooperation with other people but 
rather of antagonism and hostility toward them. 

2. Nationalism, a boomerang to those peoples ivhich 

foster it 
Its economic results: 

a. Limitation of productivity. 

b. Government supervision and direction of in- 
dustry. 

c. Lack of economic freedom for individuals. 

d. Special classes of population benefited at the 
expense of other groups. 

3. The feeling of nationality intensified by economic 

factors 

a. Tariffs — the Zollverein and German nationalism. 

b. Shipping subsidies. 

c. Government supervised trade. 

d. Government support and encouragement for its 
bankers and investors in foreign lands. 

Germany has been most notable in the use of such 
devices. 

16 



4. Conflicts between nationalities mainly over economic 
matters 

a. Efforts by nations to extend their political power 
through economic domination and exploitation of 
other peoples. 

b. Motive "selfish." Justification "might." 

"The German race is called to bind the earth 
under its control, to exploit the natural resources 
and physical powers of man, to use the passive races 
in subordinate capacity for the development of its 
Kultur. " — Ludwig Woltmann, Politische Anthro- 
pologic 

c. Most nations at one time or another have shown 

evidence of such desire, though none so blatantly 
and brazenly as Germany. 

(1) The old colonial movement — 1492 to early 
19th century. 

(2) Based upon mercantilism. 

(3) Rivalry between Holland and England in 
17th century. 

(4) Rivalry between France and England in 18th 
century. 

(5) Victory of England, 1815. 

(6) Adam Smith and laissez-faire. 

(7) Middle 19th century attitude toward colonies. 

(8) Free trade and anti-colonial movement. 

(9) Cobden and Gladstone opposed to colonial 
expansion. 

II. THE NEW IMPERIALISM— EUROPEANIZATION OF 
THE WORLD 

1. New interest in colonies since 1870 

a. Disraeli and the Suez Canal. 

b. Result of industrial revolution and improvement in 
communication. 

c. Germany's industrial development after 1870 
changed her foreign policy. 

d. Demand for colonies by England, France, Germany, 

17 



Italy, Belgium, Japan, Spain, Portugal, and the 
United States. 
e. German Empire, a late-comer in the family of na- 
tions, found the best regions for colonization and 
exploitation, especially in the temperate zones, al- 
ready occupied by others. Force to be used to 
obtain ''place in the sun." 

"We need a fleet strong enough not only to pro- 
tect the colonies we now have, but to bring about 
the acquisition of others." — Manifesto of the Ger- 
man Navy League. 

"It is only by relying on our good German sword 
that we can hope to conquer that place in the sun 
which rightly belongs to us." — German Crown 
Prince, 1913. 

2. Erroneous notions as to value of colonies 

a. As markets. Keaction against free trade after 
1870 ; protection and colonial markets ; British col- 
onies establish protective tariff; movement in Eng- 
land, led by Chamberlain ; results of preferential 
trade not great — e. g., compare Canada's trade 
with both Great Britain and Germany. 

b. As sources of foodstuffs and raw materials. Ad- 
vantage of importance only in time of war — and 
then it may be impossible of realization if the op- 
ponent has a more powerful navy. 

c. As outlet for population. Germany does not need 
an outlet for population. In recent years there has 
been immigration to Germany larger than the emi- 
gration from it. Of those who have emigrated 
from Germany few have gone to her colonies. Mis- 
taken belief, also, on part of Germany's rulers that 
colonies must be owned ; that trade with a people 
not under her political domination means loss to 
Germany. This involves misunderstanding as to 
what constitute the gains of international trade. 
Result of misunderstanding — theory that trade fol- 
lows the flag. Truth exactly the reverse of this; 
the flag follows trade and the business man. 

18 



3. Real economic explanation of imperialism 

a. Business interests dominant. 

b. Growth of capital since industrial revolution. 

c. Search for investments — larger returns from colo- 
nial investments. Concessions; investments in 
mines, rubber forests, plantations, railroads, etc. 

d. Business men desire vigorous colonial policy; 
spheres of influence ; exclusive trade rights ; and 
armament to support these policies. 

e. Investors and concessionaires take the lead and 
nations follow, e. g., Cecil Rhodes in South Africa ; 
the Mannesmann Brothers and French investors in 
Morocco ; English investors in Egypt. 

f. Interests of private individuals confused with in- 
terests of nation. Every investment in a foreign 
land an " exposed nerve-end." The success of an 
English merchant or banker at the expense of a 
German becomes an affront to Germany, and vice 
versa. German commerce and banking so closely 
identified with government that defeat of German 
traders seems especially like a defeat of the gov- 
ernment. 

4. " Arenas of friction" 

Industrially backward and politically incompetent re- 
gions which possess ample resources and cheap labor, 
but are poor in capital, political experience and defense. 
Business men in various countries feel "call" to exploit 
these regions. Cf. Kipling and "the white man's 
"burden." 

a. The Balkans. 

b. Turkey. 

c. Africa — partition. 

d. China — dismemberment. 

e. Latin America. 

f. Awakening of Japan. 

g. Russian expansion in Asia. 

5. Play for position by rival states 

a. Kaiser's demand for "a place in the sun" — col- 

19 



onies, commerce, and international influence. He 
reverses Bismarck's colonial and naval policy. 
Government aid to secure foreign markets. 

b. England's colonial position similar to that of indi- 
vidual who happens to own central business site. 

c. Germany's fear of growing power and influence of 
France, and of Russian ambitions in Balkans and 
Near East. 

d. English alarm at growth of Germany's commercial 
and industrial power from 1895-1905. 

e. Germany's desire to hamper English expansion; 
Kruger telegram of 1896 and sympathy with Boers. 

f . Two great coalitions formed. 

(1) Triple Alliance — Germany, Austria, Italy. 

(2) Triple Entente — France, Russia, England. 

Germany beaten in Morocco 

a. Small financial interests of German bankers in 
Morocco; French investors gradually acquire large 
holdings; Emperor William decides to call a halt; 
the Tangier visit, 1905. 

b. Algeciras Congress, Spain, 1906 ; France wins. 

c. Another test of strength — the Agadir incident. 
Germany yields, 1911. War threatened but bankers 
not ready. Kaiser warns them that he expects 
them to be ready for war when next called upon. 

d. France, supported by England, declares protec- 
torate over Morocco, 1912. 

e. Feeling among Germans that successful trade ex- 
pansion and opportunities for attractive invest- 
ment depend on maintenance of prestige and re- 
spect. Fear that Germany would suffer commer- 
cially and economically because of defeat in 
Morocco. Determination to re-establish prestige by 
military force. 

German ambitions in the Orient 

a. Mesopotamia and its possibilities. Germany gains 
dominant influence over Turkey, and builds the 
Bagdad Railway to connect Germany with Meso- 

20 



potamia. This is regarded as a thrust against Eng- 
lish interests and is opposed by the British after 
1899. 

b. German dominance over Balkans necessary for pro- 
tection of Bagdad Railway. Berlin, Vienna, Bel- 
grade, Sofia along the "corridor" between the 
Baltic and the Persian Gulf, Hamburg and Bagdad. 

c. Middle Europe to be Germany's economic empire. 

"The establishment of a sphere of economic in- 
fluence from the North Sea to the Persian Gulf has 
been for nearly two decades the silent, unspoken 
aim of German foreign policy." — Professor Spiet- 
hoff, in War Cyclopedia, p. 36. 

Are international conflicts over economic matters in- 
evitable f 

a. Need for proper understanding as to the factors 
which promote economic well-being. 

b. Need for recognizing that that which advances the 
interests of a comparatively few individuals does 
not necessarily benefit the great mass of people. 

c. The interests which sometimes receive most recog- 
nition are frequently not the most important from 
the standpoint of the nation ; e. g., what difference 
did it make to the millions of German citizens 
whether or not the Mannesmann Brothers made a 
profit in Morocco? 

d. Does one nation lose what another nation gains in 
international trade? 

e. Wherein is the gain from international trade? 

~P re-requisites for harmonious international relations 

a. Abandonment of narrow and selfish ideals of na- 
tionality. 

b. This involves ultimately the discontinuance of 
world-wide tariff discriminations — e. g., most- 
favored-nation tariffs, protective tariffs, etc. 

c. It involves also the removal of various other re- 
strictions and discriminations which tend to make 
people of different states hostile to each other. 

21 



TOPIC IV 

PAN-GERMANISM AND WORLD 
DOMINATION 

Compiled by C. L. Bobbins 
I. MEANING OF "PAN-GERMANISM" 

1. Best sense: an expression of German nationality 

a. National self-preservation. Passion to preserve 
and strengthen the corporate life of a great 
people. 

b. A defensive movement against surrounding 
nations. 

2. Less attractive aspects: "A system of international 

burglary" 

a. An offensive movement against England. 

b. Purpose to absorb lesser peoples of Europe and 
Asia in a German-dominated confederation; 
"Hamburg to the Persian Gulf." 

c. To weaken or destroy such nations as cannot be 
absorbed or included in the confederation. 

d. Finally to Germanize the world, making the Ger- 
man language and Kultur universal. 

II. BASES OF THE CONCEPTION 

1. Lofty ideals of the mission of the German people 

a. Fichte said that the German was the only pure 
race in Europe and the only one capable of high 
culture. 

b. Religious conception : to build up the kingdom of 
God, one must be a true German and submerge 
self in German spirit. It is regarded as a re- 
ligious duty to destroy "declining England, cor- 
rupt Belgium, licentious France, uncouth Russia" 

22 



and to rejuvenate exhausted Europe with a dif- 
fusion of German blood, 
c. The conception is carried to the extreme of for- 
getting the universality of God. 

2. Economic necessity 

a. Population had outrun economic resources — 
nearly seventy million people in a territory not 
as large as Texas. 

b. Larger export trade was enjoyed by other nations, 
particularly England. 

c. Constant fear of England's navy— danger of be- 
ing cut off from English Channel. 

d. Necessity of conquering lands of adjoining states 
or to cease to expand. 

3. Plain jealousy and greed 

Highly developed militaristic spirit: mission to be ful- 
filled only by sword 



4. 



III. PROGRAM OF THE PAN-GERMANISTS 

1. Plan of 1895-98: to unite all European peoples of 

German blood 

a. The Kaiser sought connections with various 
thrones by marriage. 

b. The conception was enlarged to extend to unre- 
lated peoples in Asia. 

c. The defeat of Russia encouraged further ex- 
pansion. 

2. Plan of 1911 

a. Definite plan for vast confederacy in Central 
Europe, from the Channel to Balkans. 

b. Submission of Balkan states. 

e. Political and military control of Turkey : Turkey 
to be aided in adding Persia and Egypt to her 
dominions. 

d. America to be exploited 

(1) South America to be colonized. 

(2) The United States to pay expenses of wars. 

23 



e. Directions of proposed expansion summarized: 
Berlin-Calais ; Berlin-Riga ; Hamburg-Salonika ; 
Hamburg-Persian Gulf; Germany-North and 
South America. 

VI. RELATION OF PAN-GERMANISM TO WAR 

1. Germany saw all her development due to war: only 
war to preserve the empire and add to it 

2. Never willing to consider arbitration 

3. The present war was desired in the interests of greater 
Germany 

4. Ruthlessness was regarded a virtue 

V. THE DEVELOPMENT OF PAN-GERMANISM 

1. Historical background 

a. Rise of Prussia. ' ' Three centuries ago, Prussia 
was a tiny state whose many parts were separated 
from each other by the lands of her neighbors. 
At the beginning of the seventeenth century, the 
Hohenzollerns were petty princes, ruling over 
Brandenburg in the north of Germany; to-day 
they are the kings of Prussia, which has engulfed 
more than half the Teutonic territory and ex- 
tends in one vast sweep from the Memel to the 
Rhine; they are German Emperors, and as such 

rule from Denmark to the Alps In 

three hundred years the Hohenzollern domains 
have increased more than thirteen fold." 

b. Prussianization of the German states. History 
shows that the Prussian character has remained 
essentially unchanged through the centuries while 
the character of the Saxons, Bavarians, and other 
German states has gradually been changed. 

"More important than the immediate political 
results were the moral effects of the methods em- 
ployed by Bismarck in the unification of Ger- 
many The theory of brute strength, 

24 



of blood and iron had triumphed 

Having witnessed the failure of the liberal and 
the success of the Bismarckian method, the Ger- 
man people conceive thereby a faith in force, a 
veneration of power and might that has directed 
in large part the subsequent course of German 
life and history." 

Characteristic policies of the Hohenzollerns 

a. Governmental. Prussia has always been prac- 
tically an absolute monarchy. While Germany 
has a constitution and a two house legislative 
body, the ministry is responsible to the crown 
alone and the Reichstag has little real power over 
the government. 

"The Emperor is no doubt the most potent fac- 
tor in German foreign and domestic politics, 
whether he rules personally like William II, or 
impersonally through a powerful statesman, like 
William I. This would not necessarily be danger- 
ous to the world if the crown were always pos- 
sessed of lofty ideals of ethical and moral 
responsibility and conduct. Numerous statements 
of Frederick the Great who is the ideal hero of 
the present Kaiser show that this has not been 
the case. On Dec. 6, 1772, Frederick the Great 
wrote to Voltaire, 'The world is governed only by 
skill and trickery. ' " 

b. Religious and moral 

"It is necessary to distinguish between public 
and private morals. For the state, self assertion 
is the greatest of all commandments; for it, this 
is absolutely moral." 

c. Greed 

"The German people is so situated in Europe 
that it needs only run and take whatever it 
requires. ' ' 

d. Militarism 

"For two hundred and fifty years, since the 
Great Elector, Prussia has always been propor- 

25 



tionately by far the strongest military power in 
Europe." The Great Elector found an army of 
1,200, he left one of 30,000 and Frederick the 
Great left one of 195,000. 

3. The development of Pan-Germanism, 

a. Efforts at expansion. With no colonial posses- 
sions in 1884, Germany by the year 1911 had 
secured 1,128,480 square miles of territory in 
Asia, Africa, and the Pacific Islands. 

b. Government control of: 

(1) Schools and universities. 

"From the earliest times to the present 
day, the Prussian Government has educated 
the young to an aggressive military patriot- 
ism and therefore it may be said that the 
German elementary school is a branch estab- 
lishment of the German barracks." 

(2) The press 

"Public opinion! Public opinion!" a 
member of the German Foreign Office re- 
peated in a tone which showed that he was 
honestly perplexed, "Why, we create it!" 

(3) The church 

(4) Industry 

c. Extension of German influence 

(1) In Austria and Turkey through financial 
assistance 

(2) In Turkey through 

(a) Reorganization of the army 

(b) Assuming a protectorate over Islam 

(c) Construction of railways 

(3) In all foreign countries through an unscru- 
pulous diplomatic and spy service. 

VI. DANGERS OF PAN-GERMANISM 

1. All solid basis for international life would be swept 
away — law, respect of treaties, etc. 

"It is absurd to inveigh against wars of conquest; 

26 



the sole point of interest is the object of the con- 
quest." "When a state recognizes that the existing 
treaties no longer express the actual political condi- 
tions, and when it cannot persuade the other powers 
to give way by peaceful negotiations, the moment has 
come when the nations proceed to the ordeal by 
battle." 

2. No nation however remote would be safe 

"Not only North America, but the whole of Amer- 
ica must become a bulwark of Germanic Kultur, per- 
haps the strongest fortress of the Germanic races." 

3. No security of peace: war a legitimate and desirable 
phase of national activity and development 

"War is the noblest and holiest expression of 
human activity." 

"We have already seen that war is both justifiable 
and moral, and that the ideal of perpetual peace is 
not only impossible, but immoral as well." 

4. Nullification of all ethical ideas and ideals: conception 
of the state as superior to morals 

"Whoever cannot prevail upon himself to approve 
from the bottom of his heart the sinking of the Lusi- 
tania, whoever cannot conquer his sense of the gi- 
gantic cruelty to unnumbered perfectly innocent vic- 
tims .... and give himself up to honest 
delight at this victorious exploit of German defensive 
power — him we judge to be no true German." 

VII. CURES FOR PAN-GERMANISM 

1. Military 

A crushing defeat on the western front, or on the 
eastern front. 

2. Diplomatic 

a. Dismemberment of the Austro-Hungarian Em- 
pire. Cheradame holds that "all the racial ele- 
ments necessary for the destruction of the Pan- 
German plan exist in Central Europe." 

27 



b. Creation of a solid Slavic state in the Balkans.. 

3. Political 

a. A German republic 

b. A league of nations to enforce peace. "When 
the present great war is over, it will be the duty 
of America to join with the other nations of the 
world in some kind of a league for the main- 
tenance of peace." 

4. Spiritual 

A return to the ideals of Schiller. The truly cultural 
and spiritual for the material. This applies to all 
nations. 

TOPIC V 

GERMAN THEORY OF THE STATE AND 
OF WAR 

Compiled by J. Van deb Zee 
I. THE STATE'S RELATION TO THE INDIVIDUAL 

1. What is a State? 

It is a political organization and has four elements: 
territory, population, independent supreme power, 
and government. 

2. German glorification of the State 

Histories, books of philosophy — indeed, the whole lit- 
erature of Germany glorifies the State as something 
mystical and divine, as an end in itself and not as a 
means to some other end such as the happiness of the 
individual. 

a. Frederick the Great and Scharnhorst stressed not 
the rights of individuals but their duties, espe- 
cially the duty to sacrifice life and property for 
the State, which is the highest good. They laid 
the foundation for the German military State. 

b. Fichte believed the German State should be "a 
contrivance whereby all human virtue is to be 
realized to the full." 

c. Hegel declared: "The State is God on earth." 

28 



d. Bismarck and the emperors had a vision of the 
paternal State, of State socialism. 

e. Treitschke said: "The State is a being infinitely 
superior to the individual and exists to realize an 
ideal beyond and above that of individual happi- 
ness." "History is a great drama and States are 
the actors in it." 

3. What is the best government for a State? 

a. The State must unite all power in the hands of a 
constitutional monarch who holds his position by 
hereditary, divine right. 

b. The monarch should be supported and assisted by 
a social aristocracy, a hereditary caste: they to- 
gether should be the mouthpiece of the State, con- 
trolling the higher offices, army, and navy. 

c. The masses, indeed, may criticise, but should not 
originate measures. The democratic ideal of 
equality is impracticable. The masses had better 
"toil at the plough, at the forge, at the carpen- 
ter's bench." 

d. The German imperial government. 

(1) The king of Prussia was Emperor. 

(2) The votes of Prussians appointed by the 
Emperor dominated the Bundesrath, and in 
the Reichstag Prussians were numerous 
enough to control. Junkers ruled Prussia. 

(3) Prussia could prevent amendments to the 
constitution. The Kaiser and his appointees 
in the Bundesrath were the final repository 
of power. 

(4) There was no universal manhood suffrage, 
but nearly 3,000,000 persons were engaged 
in Germany's civil service: hence in one 
sense the people constituted the basis of Ger- 
many's bureaucracy. 

4. What should the State do? 

(Brief answer: Everything that leads to the power 
of the State.) 

29 



a. Police work: punish transgressors against the law 
and protect persons and property, and so admin- 
ister justice. 

b. Promote "Kultur." This "Kultur," so highly 
praised by the Germans as their great contribution 
to the world's civilization, consists of many things 
worth cultivating. 

(1) Education: by means of universities, high 
schools, technical colleges, and vocational 
and elementary schools. The State should 
train all the people for constructive effort of 
some kind — for efficiency in industry, com- 
merce, and government. 

(2) Aesthetics: the State should make some pro- 
vision for the leisure time of the people. 

(3) Glorious history and splendid traditions. 

(4) Brilliant statesmanship : government by an 
aristocracy and an absolute sovereign. 

(5) The administration of public affairs should 
be in the hands of a bureaucracy — the best 
talent available should serve the State. 
Hence orderliness, finish, and perfection. 

(6) State socialism: the State should be an agen- 
cy of service in two ways by providing for 

(a) Productive socialism: the State should 
own the transportation system, tele- 
graph, telephone, and express systems, 
mines, and financial and credit agen- 
cies; study foreign markets; and pro- 
mote a merchant marine and education. 

(b) Distributive socialism: the State should 
insure against death, injury, unemploy- 
ment, and sickness in industrial occu- 
pations; and provide labor exchanges 
and other agencies for the physical 
well-being and conservation of the 
people. 

(7) Social legislation. Compare the Kaiser's 
throne speech in 1888: "Introduce the soci- 

30 



alistic element into legislation — that is a 
further development of the modern idea of 
the State, the result of Christian ethics, ac- 
cording to which the State should discharge, 
besides the defensive duty of protecting ex- 
isting rights, the positive duty of promoting 
the welfare of all its members, especially 
those who are weaker and in need of help, 
by means of judicious institutions and the 
employment of those resources of the com- 
munity which are at its disposal." 
c. Military work: to this the State should give its 
most solicitous thought. Build up a well-organ- 
ized army with universal military service. If a 
State neglects its physical in favor of its intel- 
lectual energies, it falls into decay. The army 
produces both character and education. An army 
brings unity — parliamentary government brings 
factions within the State. 

What should he the individual's place in the State? 

a. The individual may be likened to a brick in some 
vast edifice : he exists in and for the State. He 
should be taught to love the Fatherland, venerate 
the Hohenzollerns, believe in the empire's destiny, 
and sacrifice everything for the State. 

b. Since man really wants economic freedom much 
more than he wants political liberty, the State 
should give him strength, security, and material 
advantages, and in this way stunt his political 
instincts in order to avoid dangerous or revolu- 
tionary tendencies. 

c. The State should emphasize the individual's duties 
more than his rights. "Verboten" may well sum 
up the law of the land; in other words, "Be a 
soldier, pay your taxes, and keep your mouth 
shut." Thus, reduce all to a common uniformity 
and docility, and stamp out individuality. Gen- 
erations of barrack life have also helped to make 
the people submissive. Compare the Anglo-Amer- 

31 



ican theory that the State should exist for the 
individual and prohibit the influences which men- 
ace individuality. 

II. THE STATE'S RELATION TO OTHER STATES 

1. 7s it bound by international law? 

The State may act outside and above the public law of 
Europe in order to secure its own safety. Expediency 
is the State's best rule and guide. All international 
law must bow before the State's absolute sovereignty 
— that can not be bound. 

2. Are treaties to be binding? 

They should last only so long as it suits contracting 
States to observe them or rebus sic stantibus. The 
highest duty of the State is self-preservation: "our 
interest is our right." 

3. Should States arbitrate their differences? 

No efficient tribunal has been or can be devised to 
adjudicate between independent States. War alone 
can settle quarrels: it is the international law-suit. 

4. How should a State conduct foreign relations? 

a. Frederick the Great said : ' ' The world is governed 
only by skill and trickery." 

b. Treitschke wrote : ' ' The statesman has not the 
right to warm his hands by the smoking ruins of 
his country with the comfortable self-praise: 'I 
have never told a lie'; that is a monk's virtue." 

c. The State can only attain its highest moral aims 
in competition with other States, and any means 
are justified, even spying, lying, and bribing. 

5. Anglo-American theory 

a. International public opinion does give force to 
international law — its judgments are terribly ef- 
fective, and no State can ignore them with 
impunity. 

b. Brute force and vicious cunning may be the mak- 
ing of the German Super-State, but we have a 

32 



theory that ' ' right is our supreme interest. ' ' The 
rule of law won against Stuart kings in the 17th 
century must be established throughout the world 
to the immense advantage of international rela- 
tions. 

III. THE GERMAN THEORY OF WAR 

(Direct outgrowth of the German theory of the State) 

1. German apologists and eulogists of war 

Frederick the Great, Scharnhorst, Fichte, Clausewitz, 
Hartmann, Bismarck, Roon, Moltke, Treitschke, Bern- 
hardi, and Emperor William. 

2. Some German sayings about war 

a. Bernhardi: "The Right to Make War," "The 
Duty to Make War." War gives a biologically 
just decision. 

b. Treitschke speaks of the moral majesty, the great- 
ness, the moral magnificence, the sanctity of war 
"conceived as an ordinance set by God" and as 
"politics par excellence". 

c. "War is the noblest and holiest expression of 
human activity .... war is beautiful." 

d. "It is the soldier and the army, not parliamentary 
majorities and votes, that have welded the German 
Empire together. My confidence rests upon the 
army." — Emperor William II. 

3. War versus Peace 

Germans scorn Kant's dream of an ultimate rule of 
reason and of permanent universal peace. "Mad 
books" on peace are the work of "weak minds." War 
is divine and necessary. 

4. How should war be conducted? 

a. "The enemy State must not be spared the want 
and wretchedness of war; these are particularly 
useful in shattering its energy and subduing its 
will." The policy of f rightfulness, ruthlessness. 

33 



b. "The law of nations must beware of paralyzing 
military action by placing fetters upon it." 

5. Ideas inspiring the German theory 

a. War is a necessity for Germany: she must find a 
place for surplus population and markets for sur- 
plus merchandise. Colonies are needed. 

b. War is desired by God and nature. 

c. Germany must rule the world : that is Germany 's 
mission for the greater good of humanity. The 
expression "Deutschland liber Alles" is the boast- 
ful but not empty motto of the German State. 

TOPIC VI 
RUSSIA AND THE ORIENT 

Compiled by H. G. Plum 
I. THE RUSSIA OF 1914 

1. Introductory : geography, peoples, and resources 

2. Autocratic government 

a. The Executive Power — The Czar. 

b. The bureaucracy. "Russia is the true home of 
bureaucracy. Its machinery to sustain such a sys- 
tem of government was necessarily vast in extent. 
In 1897 there was one official to every 292 inhab- 
itants, or one to every 89 men. It includes in its 
personnel no Poles or other 'foreigners' but many 
Germans. The salaries at the top are very high, 
those at the bottom so low as to make some form of 
bribery necessary for the livelihood of the class." 

c. The police system. 

"In all countries, the appearance of police as a 
special institution, has been coincident with the tri- 
umph of absolutism." "The Census of 1897 tells us 
that in that year Russia boasted of 104,500 police. 
Since 1897 this figure has incessantly increased; in- 
deed, competent persons assert that it has doubled in 
the space of 10 years, i. e., one for every 200 men. 
The system cost Russia $30,000,000.00 per annum in 

34 ' 



salaries besides all the bribes and secret payments." 
"At the beginning of the war, it seemed to liberal 
Russia and the civilized world that Russian bureau- 
cracy and autocracy were impregnable." 
d. The Duma. 

(1) The revolution of 1905 and reforms leading 
to the establishment of the duma. 

(2) Its powers like those of the Reichstag wholly 
subsidiary to the ministry. 

3. Why Germany attacked Russia in 1914 

a. Common ties between the two governments. 

(1) Both were strongly imperialistic with mon- 
archs ruling by "divine right." 

(2) The ruling houses were strongly related by 
blood ties. 

(3) Germany was the "most favored nation" in 
trade and commerce. 

b. Causes for the break. 

(1) The Russian desire to secure an ice-free port 
for her commercial ambitions to the south- 
east. 

(2) The Pan-Slavic movement in Russia, 
strengthened by commercial ambitions, men- 
aced Austria in the development of her ex- 
pansion policy in the Balkans. 

(3) Industrial development in Russia had 
clashed with German commercial interests 
and bespoke the time when German economic 
influence would wane. 

II. RUSSIA IN THE WAR 

1. Russia's aims and early campaigns 

2. The Russian Revolution 

a. The Kerensky government — its rise and fall. 

b. The Bolsheviki program under Trotsky. 

(1) Basis of power: peace, lands for the peasant, 
democratic government. 

(2) The Brest-Litovsk Treaty. 

35 



(3) Evidence tending to show Bolsheviki work- 
ing for German interests. 

(4) Failure of the Bolsheviki program. 

c. The Czecho-Slovak movement. 

(1) Basis of the Czecho-Slovak movement. 

(2) Relations with the Allies. 

(3) The program of the Czecho-Slovaks. 

d. The Allies and Revolutionary Russia. 

(1) Recognition of the Czecho-Slovaks. 

(2) The All-Russia Committee and the Allies. 

(3) Effects of the Revolution upon the war and 
upon peace. 

III. THE WAR AND THE FAR EAST 

1. Japan in the Orient 

2. Why Japan entered the war 

3. America and Japan 

a. Causes for irritation: Japanese immigration, the 
United States' seizure of the Philippines, com- 
mercial rivalry. 

b. Japan's Monroe Doctrine for the Orient. 

c. No real cause for quarrel between the two powers. 

TOPIC VII 
WHY AMERICA ENTERED THE WAR 

Compiled by L. Pelzeb 
I. GERMAN INTRIGUES AND CRIMINAL ACTIVITIES 
IN THE UNITED STATES 

1. The German program against American policies 

a. Organization, persuasion, and apology. 

b. Diplomatic protests and negotiations. 

c. Intrigues, plots, and criminal activities. 

2. History of the German Military Information Bureau 

a. Establishment at 60 Wall Street, New York, in the 
autumn of 1914, under direction of Wolf von Igel ; 
leased as an " advertising office. ' ' 

36 



b. Planning and aiding in criminal activities; viola- 
tion of the laws of the United States ; destruction of 
lives and property on merchant vessels ; Irish revo- 
lutionary plots against England; fomenting of ill- 
feeling of Mexico against the United States ; main- 
tenance of the spy system under cover of a 
commercial bureau stirring up trouble in our muni- 
tion plants; the bomb industry and related 
activities. 

c. Exposure of the bureau by the Providence Journal 
early in 1915. 

d. Discovery and removal of papers by United States 
secret service agents, April, 1916. 

e. German protest against the seizures; German re- 
fusal to claim papers and bring on self-accusation. 

f. Publication of portion of the bureau's papers by 
the United States in September and October, 1917. 

3. History of the chief plotters, intriguers, and criminal 
agents 

a. Count Johan von Bernstorff, ambassador to the 
United States attempted to influence Congress, No- 
vember, 1915; sent a request to Berlin for $50,000 
to influence Congress, January, 1917 ; implicated in 
sabotage plots; obtained a propaganda fund of 
$1,683,500 for Bolo Pasha, the French traitor, who 
was later executed. 

b. Captain Franz von Papen, military attache, direct- 
ed criminal activities. 

c. Captain Karl Boy-Ed, naval attache, directed crim- 
inal activities. Both attaches were recalled in De- 
cember, 1915, upon President Wilson's demand. 

d. Bernhard Dernburg, German propagandist, de- 
fended Germany in speeches, magazine articles ; his 
defense of the "Lusitania" act caused his departure 
in June, 1915. 

e. Werner Horn attempted to blow up the bridge at 
Vanceboro, Maine ; he was tried, convicted and sent 
to the penitentiary. 



37 



f. Robert Fay for conspiring to blow up ships by time 
bombs was sentenced to eight years but escaped. 

g. Carl Ruroede, director of passport frauds, was 
sentenced to three years' imprisonment. 

h. Franz von Rintelen was convicted of putting five 
time bombs on the "Kirk Oswald." 

II. THE SUBMARINE POLICY AGAINST THE UNITED 
STATES 

1. The three stages of submarine warfare 

a. Period of comparatively inactive and legitimate 
warfare, August, 1914-February 18, 1915. 

b. Policy of restricted naval zone around the British 
Isles, February 18, 1915-February 1, 1917: to de- 
stroy every enemy merchant vessel within the zone ; 
designation of safe routes for neutrals. 

c. Campaign of ruthless, unrestricted submarine war- 
fare, February 1, 1917, to the present; destruction 
of all vessels entering the naval zone. 

2. Vessels attacked or sunk without warning 

a. "William P. Frye," March 28, 1915; Chester L. 
Thrasher, an American, lost his life. 

b. British steamer "Falaba," March 28, 1915. 

c. Attack upon the American vessel "Cushing," 
April, 1915. 

d. Sinking of the "Lusitania," May 7, 1915; sunk 
near the Irish coast without warning and with loss 
of 1152 lives of whom 114 were Americans. 

e. Attack upon steamer "Nebraskan," May 25, 1915. 

f. Attack upon British liner "Orduna," July 9, 1915. 

g. Sinking of American steamer ' ' Leelanaw, ' ' July 25, 
1915. 

h. Torpedoing of British liner "Arabic," August 19, 
1915. 

i. Torpedoing of French passenger steamer ' ' Sussex, ' ' 
March 25, 1916 ; this was not a troop vessel, was not 
armed and never had been; about 80 passengers, 
including several Americans, lost their lives. 

38 



Summary of correspondence on the "Sussex" case 

a. German note of April 10, 1916 : some other vessel, 
not the "Sussex," was torpedoed; very likely due 
to mine explosion. 

b. Secretary Lansing's reply, April 18, 1916 : elaborate 
statement of evidence and affidavits of 23 Amer- 
icans; identification of 13 pieces of metal as parts 
of a German submarine; the torpedo was of Ger- 
man manufacture and was fired without warning; 
warning that further sinkings would result in a 
break. 

c. German answer of May 4, 1916 : promise that there- 
after merchant vessels would not be sunk without 
warning or without saving lives of passengers and 
crew unless escape or resistance is attempted. 

d. Secretary Lansing's reply of May 8, 1916: accep- 
tance of promise of abandonment of warfare as 
stated in previous note. 

e. Von Jagow's note of May 8, 1916: full admission 
that "Sussex" was torpedoed by German sub- 
marine. 

Conclusions and results of "Sussex" correspondence 

a. A diplomatic victory for President Wilson. 

b. Substantial compliance (for about nine months) of 
the German government with the promise of May 4 
1916. 

c. Renunciation of all pledges in the decree of Janu- 
ary 31, 1917: the decree for unrestricted, ruthless 
submarine warfare upon all vessels in the zone set 
forth. 

d. Severance of diplomatic relations, February 3, 1917. 

e. Resumption of submarine warfare against Amer- 
ican vessels after February 3, 1917. 

f. Declaration of war against Germany, April 6, 1917. 



3!) 



TOPIC VIII 
MOBILIZATION OF AMERICAN RESOURCES 

Compiled by A. O. Thomas 
I. THE MOBILIZATION OF HUMAN RESOURCES 

1. Fighting men 

a. The American Army and Navy on April 6, 1917. 
The regular army ; national guard ; marines ; naval 
men and officers. 

b. Methods for increasing the army and navy. 

(1) The volunteer system: its history and the 
reasons for its failure in the present war. 

(2) The draft system : evolution of the draft into 
the selective draft; the democracy of the 
system; local boards. Ages 21-31 yield in- 
sufficient effectives. Ages 18-45 provide 
ample man power. 

c. The new National Army and its training. 

(1) Intensified training and short courses at 
West Point and at Annapolis. 

(2) The Reserve Officers' Training Camps. 

(3) The Cantonments. 

(4) The Students' Army Training Corps. 

(5) The Conservation of Army Morale: Army 
Y. M. C. A., K. C, and kindred organiza- 
tions. Educational program and recreation 
at the camps. 

2. Labor 

Essential and non-essential industries; industrial re- 
organization ; the wage problem. 

3. The Medical Staff and Nursing Service 

4. Public opinion 

Need for a healthy public opinion ; four-minute men ; 
Committee on Public Information. 

40 



5. Women 

National League for "Woman's Service; "Women's Land 
Army of America ; "Woman 's Committee of the Council 
of National Defense; Army Y. "W. C. A. 

6. Educational institutions 

7. Organizations for war activities at home 

Liberty Loan campaigns ; Loyalty Leagues ; Four Min- 
ute Men ; advertising experts ; artists ; interpreters and 
foreign language speakers; censors; motion picture 
campaigns. 

II. THE MOBILIZATION OF MATERIALS 

Available resources ample; their mobilization for war 
purposes a vast but imperative undertaking, as shown, for 
instance, by the housing of the mobilized population in 
thirty-two camps built in ninety days. 

1. Ordnance and ordnance supplies 

Pre-war supply small ; government control of ordnance 
plants ; the Browning machine gun ; rapid development 
of ordnance plants. 

2. Food and food production 

a. The need of surplus food. 

Army a non-producing class; the allies had to be 
fed; starving Belgium and Poland; depredations 
of the submarine; Europe's production below nor- 
mal; Australia, Argentine, etc., too remote. 

b. International and national food control. 
Regulated prices; prevented hoarding and specu- 
lation; eliminated waste. The Food Administra- 
tion. 

c. Cooperation of the U. S. Department of Agricul- 
ture. The wheat supply; the live-stock and meat 
situation. 

3. Fuels and fuel distribution 

Extraordinary pre-war demand for fuel. The short- 
age during the winter of 1917-1918. The coal fields 

41 



of the United States and our rank as coal producers. 
The Fuel Control Act; the coal conservation order; 
the stimulation of coal production. Fuel Adminis- 
trator. Oil and gas. 

The iron and steel industry 

Rank of the United States as iron producer. Home 
and foreign demand for iron and steel. How the 
United States is controlling and stimulating pro- 
duction. 

Manufacturing establishments 

a. The War Industries Board : its powers and 
functions. 

b. Government management of factories and their 
outputs. 

c. Autos and trucks: standardization of makes and 
parts; quantity production. 

d. Aeroplanes, balloons and signal corps equipment. 

e. The Liberty Motor. 

Transportation and transportation facilities: the im- 
perative need for increase and control 
a. Ships and shipyards. 

(1) Steps inaugurated to increase tonnage. 

(a) Interned ships put into service. 

(b) Neutral ships commandeered. 

(c) The United States Emergency Fleet 
Corporation : establishment of new 
shipyards and construction of new 
types of ships. 

(2) Steps taken to protect tonnage. 

(a) Camouflaged ships. 

(b) Cooperation of the Navy: the convoy 
system; chasers and destroyers, and 
anti-submarine devices. 

(3) Some results. 

(a) Challenge of submarine met and 
worsted. 

(b) An enormous merchant marine — a 
salvage of the war. 

42 



(c) A great impulse to foreign trade. 

(d) The United States destined to hold a 
commanding place in future shipping 
circles. 

(e) Tremendous docking facilities in 
France. 

b. Railways, rolling stock, and express lines : reasons 
for operation by the government. 

(1) Unified control necessary as a war measure. 

(2) Strikes and labor difficulties forestalled. 

(3) Competition and congestion reduced. 

(4) Railway equipment needed in France for 
handling troops and supplies ; at present the 
United States has 600 miles of railroad and 
250 miles of warehouses in France. 

(5) Merger of the express companies. 

7. Rapid communication 

a. Government operation of telegraph and telephone 
lines. 

b. The wireless service; cables and cable lines. 

c. Mail to and from France. 

8. Chemicals, drugs, and dyes 

a. High explosive products; development since 1916. 

b. From dye importing to dye exporting. 

c. The production of optical glass. 

III. THE MOBILIZATION OF MONEY 

1. Extraordinary demand for money and credit in war 

time 

a. Army needs food, clothing, shoes, rifles, etc. 

b. Navy needs additional ships, coal, ordnance, etc. 

c. Loans to allies; officers' and privates' pay; in- 
surance. 

2. Methods of raising money for war expenses 

a. Liberty loans : how authorized ; amounts raised ; 
number of subscribers. 

b. War savings stamps and certificates. 

43 



c. The War Revenue Acts: excise, stamp, and in- 
heritance taxes; increased postage rates. 

d. Income taxes. 

e. Excess profits tax: some industries profit more 
than others from the war — they should pay a 
higher tax. 

f. War Credits Act: short loans by government 
authorized by Congress; Treasury certificates. 

TOPIC IX 
AMERICAN DEMOCRACY AND IDEALS 

Compiled by E. D. Starbuck 

I. WHAT IS DEMOCRACY? 

1. Democracy means the self -direction of all the people 
in the pursuit of their common interests. Its ideal is a 
self-directed community of free personalities. See 
other definitions. 

2. The one deadly enemy of democracy is selfishness, 
greed 

3. Four elemental facts underlying political democracy 

a. Certain inviolable rights of man. 

b. The source of political power and authority re- 
sides in each and all of the members of the state: 
' ' popular sovereignty. ' ' 

e. Specialization of duties with relative autonomy 

of groups, 
d. The invention of representative government. 

4. Four fundamental principles of true democracy 

a. Freedom; individuality; self-direction partici- 
pated in by all. 

b. Loyalty ; responsibility to the group ; a common 
united life; duties that bind individuals into a 
community; universal spirit of good will. 

c. Fair play ; the determination of freedom and loy- 
alty along the lines of generosity and justice 
rather than of personal advantage. 

d. Spontaneity ; the transformation of rights and 

44 



duties into opportunities; free personality finding 
its fulfillment through the group ; sportsmanship. 

5. Aspects of the evolution of democracy 

a. National freedom and sovereignty. 

b. Political freedom, i. e., equality of classes and 
individuals before the law, and universal suffrage. 

c. Social freedom, i. e., abolition of class distinctions, 
privileges and inequalities of opportunity. 

d. Moral and religious freedom, i. e., full moral self- 
direction by the individual, and the decline of the 
coercive aspects of government. 

6. What democracy does not do 

a. Seek artificial equality. 

b. Stand in the way of individual initiative and lead- 
ership. 

c. Oppose centralized authority. 

d. Encourage personal ideals incompatible with the 
group welfare; for example, the half truths of 
license, anarchy, "personal liberty," etc. 

II. ORIGIN OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 

1. Selection, through immigration of the "common 

people" 

2. Our European heritage tending towards individualism 

and freedom from autocracy 

a. The Greek city-states. 

b. The English revolutions. 

c. The Renaissance. 

d. The French Revolution. 

3. Events and conditions in America that have acceler- 

ated freedom of individual, group, and nation 

a. Compact of the Pilgrim Fathers, Nov. 2, 1620. 

b. The American Revolution and the Declaration of 
Independence, July 4, 1776. 

c. Freedom and individuality of frontier life. 

d. The removal of property qualifications for suf- 
frage, 1790-1850. 

45 



e. The Civil War and the adoption of the 13th, 14th, 
and 15th amendments, 1861-1870. 

f. "Woman suffrage adopted in western states, 1869 
to date. 

4. Conditions that have fostered cooperation, organiza- 

tion, good will — a true social body 

a. Industrial — small free holdings of public lands 
instead of large grants to syndicates. 

b. Economic — unifying effects of canals, railroads, 
telegraphs, telephone, postal service, banking sys- 
tem — rendering easy the exchange of goods and 
ideas. 

c. Educational — the ''common school" system. See 
the "Ordinance of 1787." 

d. Political — the unifying effect of public discussion 
and public adjustment of common interests and 
problems. 

e. Religious — Church Federation, cooperation, and 
the Social Service movement. 

5. Great prophets and leaders of American democracy 
Samuel Adams, Thomas Paine, Thomas Jefferson, 
Andrew Jackson, Abraham Lincoln, Woodrow Wilson. 

6. The message of America to the world An the present 

crisis 

a. Disinterested service. 

b. Morality in international relations. 

c. The recognition of certain inviolable rights of 
"nations," small and great. 

III. THE TASKS OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 

1. Make our democracy safe and stable 

a. By a general understanding of the excesses of an 
unconstitutional democracy. 

b. By an adequate system of universal compulsory 
and free education. 

c. By definite training in citizenship. 

d. By race assimilation. 

46 



2. Complete and perfect political democracy in all of its 

aspects 

a. Attempted devices for more direct democracy such 
as the initiative and referendum, the recall, the 
short ballot, and commission government. 

b. Universal suffrage within the limits of justice. 

c. Social legislation primarily designed to recom- 
pense the individual when unavoidably injured by 
necessary social action. 

(1) Indemnity for detention on a false charge or 
other legal action. Cf . North Dakota law. 

(2) Rehabilitation of wounded soldiers. 

(3) Social insurance against industrial accident, 
unemployment, and sickness; old age pen- 
sions. 

3. Strive for the attainment of true social democracy 

a. By utilizing political democracy, the natural in- 
strument of social justice, abolishing all private 
monopoly, unjust privilege, and despotic power in 
the industrial world. 

b. By eliminating and preventing all hereditary 
parasitic social classes, and inaugurating a posi- 
tive social effort to render the unfit fit. 

c. Cultivate a healthy scorn of caste and snobbery in 
every form. Autocracy rests on caste, favors pro- 
motion by birth and inheritance and makes in- 
vidious distinctions between vocations; democracy 
rests on "open classes," favors promotion for 
merit only and dignifies every useful vocation. 

4. Foster democratic readjustments in those institutions 

that mould the sympathies and ideals of children 

a. The home, with its autocratic traditions. 

b. The school with its imperialisms. 

5. America's purpose in the world war 

a. To emphasize justice as the enduring basis of 
peace and good will. 

"Let it be said again that autocracy must first be 
shown the utter futility of its claims to power or 

47 



leadership in the modern world. It is impossible 
to apply any standard of justice so long as such 
forces are unchecked and undefeated as the present 
rulers of Germany command. Not until that has 
been done can Right be set up as arbiter and peace- 
maker among the nations. But when that has 
been done — as, God willing, it assuredly will be — 
we shall at last be free to do an unprecedented 
thing, and this is our time to avow our purpose 
to do it. We shall be free to base peace on gener- 
osity and justice, to the exclusion of all selfish 
claims to advantage even on the part of the vic- 
tors." — President Wilson's Address, December 4, 
1917. 

b. To secure the self-determination of all nations and 
of all lesser natural human groups. 

c. To wage the first war against war. 

d. To help organize a society of nations with execu- 
tive powers, as the only way to disarmament and 
world peace. 

"If it be indeed and in truth the common object 
of the governments associated against Germany 
and of the nations whom they govern, as I believe 
it to be, to achieve by settlements a secure and last- 
ing peace, it will be that all who sit down at the 
peace table shall come ready and willing to pay 
the price, the only price that will secure it; and 
ready and willing, also, to create in some virile 
fashion the only instrumentality by which it can 
be made certain that the agreement of the peace 
will be honored and fulfilled. 

' ' That price is impartial justice in every item of 
the settlement, no matter whose interest is crossed. 
That indispensable instrument is a league of na- 
tions formed under covenants that will be effica- 
cious. Without such an instrumentality by which 
the peace of the world can be guaranteed, peace 
will rest in part upon the word of outlaws and 
only upon that word. For Germany will have to 

48 



redeem her character, not by what happens at the 
peace table but by what follows. 

"And as I see it, the constitution of that league 
of nations and the clear definition of the objects 
must be a part — is in a sense the most essential 
part — of the peace settlement itself." 

TOPIC X 

OUR ALLIES : WHAT THEY BRING US 
AND WE THEM 

Compiled by J. H. Scott 

I. INTRODUCTORY: ALLIANCE FOR WAR 

1. Coalitions disturbing the balance of power 

a. 1815, The Holy Alliance. 

b. 1872, The Alliance of the Three Emperors. 

c. 1879, The Dual Alliance. 

d. 1881, The Triple Alliance. 

e. 1898, German-Turkish Understanding. 

2. Counter adjustments to preserve the balance of power 

a. 1891, Franco-Russian Entente. 

b. 1901, Franco-Italian Understanding. 

c. 1902, Anglo-Japanese Treaty. 

d. 1904, Franco-British Entente. 

e. 1905, Anglo-Russian Entente. 

3. Alignments during the present world war 

a. The ' ' Central ' ' group : Austria, Germany, Turkey, 
and Bulgaria. 

b. The "Allied" group: Serbia, Russia, France, 
Belgium, Great Britain, Montenegro, Egypt, 
Japan, Portugal, Italy, San Marino (Italy), Rou- 
mania, Greece, United States, Cuba, Panama, Siam, 
Liberia, China, Brazil, Guatemala, Nicaragua, 
Honduras, Costa Rica, and the Czecho-Slovaks. 



49 



II. CHARACTERIZATION OF THE ALLIES' COUN- 
TRIES 

1. Great Britain 

a. External. A loose aggregation of peoples, center- 
ing in the Anglo-Saxon-Celtic stock of the British 
Isles (120,000 square miles; 46,000,000 popula- 
tion), and embracing in overseas colonies and de- 
pendencies about one quarter of the area and 
population of the globe (14,000,000 square miles; 
450,000,000 population). 

b. Temperamental. 

(1) Isolation — insularity — conservatism. The 
Anglo-Saxon is highly individualistic, 
austere, and self-contained. He reveres tra- 
ditional ways, whatever has been duly con- 
stituted or established; and shows rare effi- 
ciency in dealing with new conditions under 
ancient forms and usages. 

(2) Preference of action to intellection. The 
Englishman is interested in particulars rath- 
er than in generalities ; in handling situations 
rather than constructing theories ; he looks 
to cases rather than to codes. Abstract and 
purely intellectual pursuits he has neglected 
to make a world-wide reputation as sports- 
man and traveler, as sailor and soldier, and 
as a colonizer. 

(3) Moral stability: seriousness. His homeland, 
its liberties, and its local associations and 
traditions are dear to him ; most intimate ties 
bind him to his family, and to a few chosen 
friends. A proneness to criticize himself and 
his surroundings is supplemented by a bur- 
dening sense that he must effect reforms. 
Strictness of conscience, and loyalty to law, 
order, and justice are his master qualities. 

2. France 

a. External. The premier nation of Europe for a 

50 



thousand years, France is inhabited by a compos- 
ite race which, despite its provincial differentia- 
tions, is homogeneous and nicely tempered. A 
population of 40,000,000 occupies something over 
207,000 square miles (most of it intensively culti- 
vated in small holdings) and controls colonies, 
largely African, some 4,500,000 square miles in 
extent. 

b. Temperamental. 

(1) Long-standing misconception of the French: 
attributable to centuries of Franco-British 
conflict; to extreme differences of character; 
to judgments based superficially on the 
atypical Parisian type. Excitability, merri- 
ment, volubility, and enthusiasm, added to a 
frank fearlessness of change, have given an 
impression of lightness, shallowness, and gen- 
eral instability. 

(2) The essential soundness of French character: 
intellectualists and realists, the French have 
exalted cool reason, sanity, and practicality 
above illusion and sentiment. Precision of 
method and sureness of touch are inborn 
traits, as also are industry and thrift, re- 
sourcefulness, and thoroughness. Social be- 
yond all other peoples, the French are 
distinguished for catholicity and solidarity. 
They are tolerant, disciplined, and law- 
abiding as citizens ; they are marked by con- 
stant political preoccupation, though in an 
avocational sense, and by a burning devotion 
to the beloved homeland, la patrie. 

Belgium 

A people united, though of two contrasted racial 
types, Gallic and Germanic, numbering some 7,500,000 
and occupying 11,000 square miles of territory. 
Famed of old for courage, and for a jealous guarding 
of their municipal and national prerogatives, the 

51 



Belgians have been tempered by centuries of ceaseless 
struggle against foreign aggression. Since their sep- 
aration from Holland in 1831 and the guaranteeing of 
their neutrality in 1839, they have shown, as often 
before, wonderful recuperative powers in successfully 
turning their released energies to the arts of peace. 
Intensive development, pacifism, and a cosmopolitan 
outlook are outstanding Belgian characteristics. 

4. Italy 

This country, the home of Mazzini and Garibaldi, 
has a population of about 35,000,000 occupying 110,000 
square miles, and since 1870 has possessed an autono- 
mous government and a place among the ' ' Great Pow- 
ers. " Long committed to an irredentist and imperial- 
istic policy, these ultra-nationalistic expansionist 
ambitions have to-day given place to a popular accla- 
mation of the allied program of self-determination and 
internationalism for all states, great and small alike. 

5. Servia and her neighbors 

Small monarchies, largely of peasant stock, living in 
dreams of past national glory, and in hopes of restor- 
ing the political integrity of the past. The Czecho- 
slovaks and the Poles deserve special mention. 

6. Portugal 

For over five hundred years a loyal ally of England. 
A republic since 1912. 

7. The United States 

A "melting pot" 3,000,000 square miles in extent, 
wonderfully rich in natural resources, and inhabited 
by 100,000,000 people, on the whole easy-going, free- 
dom-loving, optimistic, and moral. Dominant traits 
are inventiveness, energy, delight in competition, and a 
capacity for the organization and operation of vast 
enterprises. 

8. Latin America 

Once composed of Spanish colonies, now of republics 
which in emulation of their northern sister have rap- 

52 



idly advanced to positions of dignity and consideration 
in the world 's family of nations. 

9. Liberia 

An African republic founded by emancipated 
American negroes. 

10. Russia, Arabia, Japan 

III. THE DEBT OF DEMOCRACY TO THE PRINCIPAL 
ALLIED NATIONS 

1. To the French Republic: mother of equalities and of 

political philosophies 

a. The ups and downs of French republicanism. 

(1) To 1789— ''The Old Regime." 

(2) 1789-92— Through Assembly to First Re- 
public. 

(3) 1793-1804— Through Directory and Consul- 
ate to First Empire. 

(4) 1830 — Bourgeois Monarchy. 

(5) 1848— Second Republic. 

(6) 1851 — Second Empire. 

(7) 1871— Through Commune to Third Republic. 

b. Humanitarian basis of French republicanism: 
Rousseau; ''Liberty, Equality, Fraternity;" social 
amelioration; governmental machinery as related 
to the actual life of France. 

2. To the American Federation: pioneer of independence 
a. American obligation. 

(1) To England, for the Anglo-Saxon birthright 
of self-government. 

(2) To France, for ideals and formulas under- 
lying our political institutions, as well as for 
material assistance during the first critical 
years of national existence. 

(3) Important milestones of democratic progress. 
(a) 1776— The Declaration of Independ- 
ence : proclaiming the right of one free 
people to control its own national 
destinies. 

53 



(b) 1823 — Monroe's message to Congress: 
maintaining the right of all American 
peoples to the same political oppor- 
tunity enjoyed by the United States. 

(c) 1863 — Lincoln's memorial address at 
Gettysburg: reiterating our continued 
faith in ' ' government of the people, for 
the people, and by the people." 

(d) 1917 — Wilson's address to the joint 
session of Congress : announcing the 
American determination that the whole 
world "must be made safe for democ- 
racy; its peace planted upon tested 
foundations of political liberty." 

(4 Contributions to democratic institutions : 

(a) The federal idea. 

(b) The Constitution. 

(e) Equal electoral suffrage. 

(d) The veto. 

(e) Territorial probation. 

(f) Pan-Americanism. 

(g) The theory of entangling alliances. 

3. To the British Empire: mother of liberty and founder 

of commonwealths 

a. Ancient tradition of self-government : an evolution, 
centuries long, toward free institutions, and re- 
sulting in autonomous states dwelling voluntarily 
in an imperial circle. "The Crowned Republic." 

b. The commonwealth of British nationalities : in the 
dependencies and crown colonies, self-direction of 
all domestic matters ; in the protectorates, an ap- 
prenticeship in free and civilized institutions 
under a nation most just and peaceable and free. 

c. Tendencies : federalization vs. decentralization. 
Ireland, India, Canada, South Africa, Australasia. 

4. Conclusion: an alliance for peace 

The larger program of democracy: a "League of 
Nations" to ensure peace, promote mutual under- 
standing, and encourage international cooperation. 

54 



TOPIC XI 

PEACE TERMS OF THE CENTRAL POWERS 
AND OF THE ALLIES 

Compiled by S. B. Sloan 
I. PEACE PROPOSAL OF THE CENTRAL POWERS 

1. Germany's peace note to the neutral powers, December 
12, 1916 

To the Entente Allies it was rather vague and did 
not state any terms. The essential point of the note 
was the following : Germany and her allies did not aim 
to annihilate their adversaries despite a consciousness 
of military and economic strength and a readiness to 
continue the war to the bitter end, but, prompted by a 
desire to avoid further bloodshed, the four Central 
Powers proposed to enter into peace negotiations. 

2. Similar note to the Pope on the same date 

Less boastful and threatening, but no terms were 
stated. 

3. Austria's contemporaneous separate statement 

It claimed to be animated "neither by aggressive 
purposes nor by designs of conquest, but solely by the 
bitter necessity of self-defense." 

4. The German Chancellor's speech on the same day be- 
fore the Reichstag 

He set up self-defense as the cause of the war, and, 
after boasting of military strength and successes on 
the battle-field, he denied the charge that the Central 
Powers "plan to conquer the whole world." 

5. Premier Briand's answer, December 13, 1916 

Before the Chamber of Deputies he declared that 
the peace proposal of the Central Powers was vague 
and indefinite and a crude trap. 

55 



6. The Russian Duma's answer, December 15 

A categorical refusal to enter into any peace negoti- 
ations whatever. 

7. Lloyd-George's reply, December 19 

Before the House of Commons he insisted upon resti- 
tution, reparation, and guarantees from the Central 
Powers as conditions to peace. 

8. Combined reply of the Entente Allies dated in Paris, 
December 30 

It characterized the document of the Central Powers 
as "pretended propositions of peace" and protested 
against two essential statements: that the Entente Al- 
lies were responsible for the war and that the Central 
Powers were victorious. The Entente Allies could see 
in the overtures made by the Central Powers nothing 
but an effort to impose a German peace, and they re- 
fused to consider a proposal which was insincere. 

II. PRESIDENT WILSON'S PEACE SUGGESTIONS 

1. Wilson's note to the belligerent nations, December 18, 
1916 

The President offered certain suggestions looking to- 
ward peace which had long been in his mind and had 
no connection with the recent overtures of the Central 
Powers, but which might be considered with proposals 
for peace. The President's suggestions and opinions 
in brief were : 

a. He thought an early occasion should be sought for 
a statement and comparison of the views and peace 
terms of the various nations at war. 

b. He would serve in any way that might be accep- 
table; would even be willing to take the initiative, 
if only the great object might be attained. 

c. He assumed that the aims of the belligerents were 
virtually the same. 

d. He emphasized the fact that the concrete objects 
for which the war was being waged were never 
definitely stated. 

56 



e. He did not propose peace, not even mediation, but 
he proposed that soundings be taken. 

2. The German Government's brief reply, December 26, 

1916 

a. An immediate exchange of views seemed appro- 
priate. 

b. In the sense of its note of December 12th it pro- 
posed an immediate meeting of delegates of the 
belligerents at a neutral place. 

c. After the end of the present struggle, it would be 
ready to collaborate with the United States in the 
exalted task of preventing future wars. 

3. The Entente Allies answer President Wilson, January 

10, 1917 

a. The Entente Allies thought it was impossible at 
present to attain a peace that would assure repara- 
tion, restitution, and the desired guaranties. 

b. The .Entente Allies were pleased that President 
Wilson's communication was not associated in 
origin with that of the Central Powers of Decem- 
ber 12th. 

c. The Entente Allies protested against the assertion 
that the aims of the two groups of belligerents 
were similar. 

d. The Entente Allies refused to make known in detail 
their war aims until the hour of negotiations, but 
would insist upon the restoration of Belgium, of 
Servia, and of Montenegro, with indemnities ; evac- 
uation of the invaded territories of France, of 
Russia, and of Roumania, with reparation; re- 
organization of Europe ; the expulsion from Europe 
of the Ottoman Empire, etc. 

III. POPE BENEDICT'S PLEAS FOR PEACE 

1. Vain appeal on the first anniversary of the war 

2. Second appeal, August 1, 1917 

The Pope asked for an agreement on the following 

57 



points, which seemed to him to offer the basis of a just 
and lasting peace : 

a. The material force of arms must give way to the 
moral force of right. 

b. Simultaneous and reciprocal decrease of armaments. 

c. Compulsory arbitration. 

d. Freedom and community of the seas. 

e. Entire and reciprocal condonation for damages and 
cost of the war. 

f. Reciprocal restitution of occupied territory, in- 
cluding the German colonies. 

g. The aspirations of the population should determine 
in disputed territories. 

3. Reply of the United States 

"To deal with such a power (the ruthless master of 
the German people) by way of peace upon the plan 
proposed by his Holiness the Pope would, so far as we 
can see, involve a recuperation of his strength and a 

renewal of its policy We can not take the 

word of the present rulers of Germany as a guaranty 
of anything that is to endure." 

4. Reply of Germany 

' ' The German people support his Majesty in his keen 
desire for peace. . . . The Imperial Government will 
in this respect support every proposal compatible with 
the vital interest of the German Empire and people." 

5. Reply of Austria 

"We see in the proposals of your Holiness a suitable 
basis for initiating negotiations with a view to pre- 
paring a peace just to all and lasting." 

IV. PRESIDENT WILSON'S PEACE TERMS 

1. Address oefore Congress, January 8, 1918 

The President laid down the following essentials for 
a lasting and honorable peace : 

(1) Open covenants of peace without private inter- 
national understandings. 

58 



(2) Absolute freedom of the seas in peace or war except 
as they may be closed by international action. 

(3) Removal of all economic barriers and the estab- 
lishment of an equality of trade conditions among 
nations consenting to peace and pledging them- 
selves for its maintenance. 

(4) Guaranties for the reduction of national arma- 
ments to the lowest point consistent with domestic 
safety. 

(5) International adjustment of all colonial claims 
based on the principle that the peoples concerned 
have equal weight with the claims of the govern- 
ments involved. 

(6) Evacuation of all Russian territory and a humane 
settlement of all questions affecting Russia. 

(7) Evacuation and restoration of Belgium without 
any attempt to limit her sovereignty. 

(8) All French territory to be freed and restored, and 
the wrong done in the matter of Alsace-Lorraine 
to be righted. 

(9) Readjustment of Italy's frontiers along clearly 
recognizable lines of nationality. 

(10) Freest opportunity for autonomous development of 
the people of Austria-Hungary. 

(11) Evacuation of Roumania, Serbia, and Montenegro, 
with access to the sea for Serbia, and international 
guaranties of economic and political independence 
and territorial integrity of the Balkan states. 

(12) Secure sovereignty for the Turkish portion of the 
Ottoman Empire, assured security of life and op- 
portunity of autonomous development of the other 
nationalities under Turkish rule, and Dardanelles 
permanently opened to all nations. 

(13) Establishment of an independent Polish state, in- 
cluding territories inhabited by undisputedly Pol- 
ish population, with free access to the sea, and 
political and economic independence and territorial 
integrity guaranteed by international covenant. 

(14) General association of nations under specific cove- 

59 



nants for mutual guaranties of political independ- 
ence and territorial integrity to large and small 
states alike. 

2. Address at Mt. Vernon, July 4, 1918 

The President laid stress upon four general principles 
as follows : 

a. The destruction or reduction of every arbitrary 
power that can disturb the peace of the world. 

b. The settlement of every question with respect to 
the rights of the different countries or peoples 
invaded. 

c. The consent of all nations to be governed in their 
conduct toward each other by the principles of 
justice and honor. 

d. The establishment of an organization of peace that 
will afford a tribunal of opinion to which all must 
submit. 

3. In an address at New York, September 27, 1918, 
President Wilson restated many of these ideas, and in 
addition insisted upon these two things as necessary 
for real peace: 

a. No special alliances. 

b. No economic boycotts. 

V. AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN PEACE FEELER 

1. The Austro-Hungarian note of September 16 

It was presented to the President by the Swedish 
Minister at 6 :30 P. M. on September 16, and answered 
at 6 :45 P. M., and made the following points : 

a. It recalled the former attempt of the Quadruple 
Alliance to bring about peace negotiations (De- 
cember 12, 1916). Despite its rejection, it made 
the ''question of peace the center of discussion in 
ever-increasing measure." As a result of these 
discussions, "it can be stated that the distance be- 
tween the conceptions of the two sides has, on the 
whole, grown somewhat less." 

b. "President Wilson .... has formulated 

60 



principles which have not encountered contradic- 
tion on the part of his allies, and the far-reaching 
application of which is likely to meet no objection 
on the part of the Powers of the Quadruple Alli- 
ance." It must be remembered, however, that 
"agreements on general principles are insuffi- 
cient." Attention must be directed to the prac- 
tical application. 

c. Fruitful progress can not be made in public dis- 
cussions of the practical applications for fear of 
"unfavorably influencing feeling at home so as to 
endanger the interest of their arms" or of "pre- 
maturely betraying their own ultimate intentions." 

d. The note, therefore, proposed a confidential and 
unbinding discussion of the basic principles by 
authorized delegates from all belligerents. 

2. The accompanying note 

The Austro-Hungarian note was accompanied by ex- 
planations why Austria hoped that this move would 
succeed where former attempts had failed. 

3. President Wilson's reply 

"The government of the United States feels that 
there is only one reply which it can make to the sug- 
gestion of the Imperial Austro-Hungarian Government. 
It has repeatedly and with entire candor stated the 
terms upon which the United States would consider 
peace and can and will entertain no proposal for a 
conference upon a matter concerning which it has made 
its position and purpose so plain." 

VI. GERMAN PEACE EFFORT 

1. Prince Maximilian's note to President Wilson 

The German Chancellor early in October made three 
main requests: 

a. A peace conference of all the belligerent states 
should be held. 

b. Wilson's fourteen points should be accepted as a 
basis for negotiations. 

61 



c. An armistice should be declared while peace was 
under consideration. 

President Wilson's reply, two days later 

The note consisted mainly of these three questions: 

a. Whether Prince Maximilian spoke for the Ger- 
man government or the German people ? 

b. "Whether Germany would be willing to evacuate 
all of the territory her soldiers held? 

c. Whether Germany accepted the fourteen points 
in fact as well as for a basis of negotiations ! 

The German Government's reply 

Assurance was given that Maximilian spoke for the 
German people, that Germany would evacuate con- 
quered territory as a preliminary to an armistice, and 
that President Wilson's fourteen points were accepted 
in full. President Wilson was asked to bring about 
the meeting of a mixed commission to make the neces- 
sary arrangements for evacuation. 

President Wilson's answer of Octooer 14th 
It laid emphasis on three things: 

a. The process of evacuation and the conditions of 
an armistice must be left to the military advisers 
of the Allied Powers. 

b. No armistice could be considered so long as the 
armed forces of Germany continued their illegal 
and inhuman practices. 

c. The German people must change their form of 
government so that the future peace of the world 
may not be endangered. 



62 



BIBLIOGRAPHY 

Following is a list of the principal reference books used in 

the course. 

Alexander, The Prussian Elementary Schools, The Macmillan 
Co., 1918. 

Angell, The Problems of the War and the Peace, London, William 
Heinemann, 1918. 

Archer, Gems (?) of German Thought, Doubleday, Page and Co., 
1917. 

The Thirteen Days, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1915. 

Beard, American Citizenship, The Macmillan Co., 1914. 

Beck, The Evidence in the Case, G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1915. 

Brooks, As Others See Us, The Macmillan Co., 1909. 

Cestre, France, England and European Democracy, G. P. Put- 
nam's Sons, 1918. 

Cheradame, Pan-Germany, The Disease and Cure, Atlantic 
Monthly Press, Boston, 1917. 

Chitwood, Immediate Causes of the Great War, Thomas Y. 
Crowell Co., 1917. 

Clark, Hamilton and Moulton, Readings in the Economics of 
War, University of Chicago Press, 1918. 

Current History of New York Times, The European War, New 
York Times Co., 1917. 

Davis, The Boots of the War, The Century Co., 1918. 

Gibbons, The New Map of Europe, The Century Co., 1918. 

Griggs, The Soid of Democracy, The Macmillan Co., 1918. 

Guerard, French Civilization in the Nineteenth Century, The 
Century Co., 1914. 

Hart, America at War, George H. Doran Co., 1918. 

Hayes, A Political and Social History of Modern Europe, The 
Macmillan Co., 1916. 

Hazen, The Government of Germany, Government Printing Of- 
fice, Washington, 1918. 

Holt and Chilton, European History, 1862-1914, The Macmillan 
Co., 1917. 

63 



Howe, Socialized Germany, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1915. 

Jastrow, The War and the Bagdad Railway, J. B. Lippincott 
Co., 1917. 

Kawakami, Japan in World Politics, The Macmillan Co., 1917. 

LeBon, The Psychology of the Great War, T. Fisher Unwin, Ltd., 
London, 1916. 

Levine, The Russian Revolution, Harper and Brothers Co., 1917. 

Lichnowsky, My Mission to London, George H. Doran Co., 1918. 

Lippmann, The Stakes of Diplomacy, Henry Holt and Co., 1915. 

Mugge, Heinrich von Treitschke, Dodge Publishing Co., New 
York, 1913. 

Miihlon, Revelations by an Ex-Director of Krupp's, George H. 
Doran Co., 1918. 

Notestein and Stoll, Conquest and Kultur, Issued by Committee 
of Public Information, 1918. 

Roosevelt, America and the World War, Charles Scribner's Sons, 
1915. 

Schapiro, Modern and Contemporary European History, Hough- 
ton Mifflin Co., 1918. 

Seymour, The Diplomatic Background of the War, Yale Univer- 
sity Press, 1916. 

Sperry, German Plots and Intrigues, Issued by Committee on 
Public Information, 1918. 

Talbot, Americanization, The H. W. Urlson Co., 1917. 

Tardieu, France and the Alliances, The Macmillan Co., 1908. 

Usher, Challenge of the Future, Houghton Mifflin Co., 1916. 
Pan-Germanism, Houghton Mifflin Co., 1913. 

Veblen, Theory of the Leisure Class, The Macmillan Co., 1899. 

War Cyclopedia, Government Printing Office, Washington, 1918. 

Wilson, Addresses, Henry Holt and Co., 1918. 

Zimmern, The Economic Weapon, George H. Doran Co., 1918. 



64 



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